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NOTES

"Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing,
Airbus, and the Battle for the
Geopolitical Future
ABSTRACT

The commercial aircraft industry is important to the
United States for both economic and political reasons.
Economically, commercial aviation has been the linchpin of the
military-industrialcomplex and a positive actor on many other
segments of U.S. industry. Politically, Boeing has ensured the
lead of the United States in the aviation industry and aviation
exports, which have a beneficial effect on the ability of the
United States to export geopoliticalpower.
Cognizant of this salutary effect of a successful aviation
industry on the United States, Europe created and financed
Airbus as a direct competitor to Boeing, hoping it would play
the same role for the European Union that Boeing has played
for the United States. Recent events, especially the proposed
A380 super-jumbo jet and the advancing development of the
European Army, place Airbus at the crossroads of European
technological advance and military integration, and make
Airbus'success vital to that of the "EuropeanProject."
Though global trade agreements such as GATT and the
WTO have attempted to deal with this sensitive political and
economic issue, they have been unable to do so successfully.
This has happened for a number of reasons, ranging from the
weakness of the dispute resolution structures embedded in the
trade agreements to the intransigenceof the principles involved.
However, in dealing with Airbus' attempt to steal Boeing's
market share and serve as a cohesive force for European
integration, U.S. policy makers should not, as in the past, throw
up their hands at the collective inaction of trade bodies and
accept the status quo. Rather, they should seek heterodoxical
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solutions, especially in the diplomatic sphere, to deal with this
pressing and potentiallyparadigm-shiftingissue.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Civil aviation is the largest export industry in the United States,
and the Boeing Corporation, which controls nearly one hundred
percent of the U.S. civil aviation manufacturing industry, is the
largest exporting manufacturer in the United States and the world.'
Boeing's impact on the U.S. economy, while possibly limited in purely
macroeconomic terms by its status as one large multinational
corporation among many, is immense. It is also disproportionate
2
when considered in industrial, strategic, and geopolitical terms. In a

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 102ND CONGRESS, COMPETING
1.
ECONOMICS: AMERICA, EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC RIM 345 (1991); see also David Cantor,

Aircraft Production and the

United States Economy, in STAFF OF HOUSE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE, 102ND CONG., AIRBUS INDUSTRY: AN
ECONOMIC AND TRADE PERSPECTIVE 45 (1992).
Perhaps Boeing's importance in macroeconomic terms is not insignificant;
2.
it has been estimated that among manufacturing, supplies, subcontractors, and other
assorted by-products of civil aircraft production, almost 80% of the United States
economy is in some way affected by the civil aircraft sector. See generally UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS OF UNITED
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time of increasing globalization, and the concomitant dilution and
diminution of national symbols, Boeing is one of the world's most
recognizable and valuable brands. 3 In a time of increasing economic
fragmentation, Boeing's presence as a dominant force in the U.S.
4
industrial market enables various other actors in the U.S. economy.
In a time of consolidation of military contractors, 5 Boeing has
emerged as one of perhaps three or four military-industrial market
participants capable of meeting the needs of the United States
6
military across a variety of product lines.
Airbus occupies a similar economic and geopolitical space in the
European economy. 7 Unlike Boeing, however, which came to its
market prominence and industrial influence through the winnowing
influences of U.S.-style capitalism,8 Airbus was designed by European
governments to play such a dominant role.
As the Office of
Technology Assessment has acknowledged:
European planners value aircraft manufacture explicitly for the
employment it creates. An Airbus official explained that the main
reason the collaboration works is that by creating jobs in an export
industry, Airbus enables the member countries to capture jobs from
other parts of the world. . . . With government commitment to full
employment, policymakers view the thousands of jobs Airbus creates in
[European Union-member countries] as well worth the costs of the
supports provided. 9

Whether looked at through the lens of hard power, soft power, or
economic power,10 the success and maintenance of Boeing's

STATES ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT
1-1 (1993).
3.
American Brands in a Global World, at http://www.wdhb.com/
Englishhtm4ep-pub_01.html (citing Boeing as one of the most valuable brands in
exporting the image and values of the United States).
4.
Boeing Sales Help Reduce Trade Deficit, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 1990, at
B1.
5.
Emma Kelly, The Third Element, FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 5, 2002.
6.
John Holusha, InternationalFlights, Indeed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, § 1,
at 49.
7.
Pierre Sparaco, Europe Faces Tense Social Disputes, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 20, 1995, at 67, availableat 1995 WL 10193320.
8.
Thomas Boeder, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: The Economics,
Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry, ANTITRUST BULL., Mar. 22, 2000,
at 119.
9.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 378-48.
10.
The terms "hard power" and "soft power," first popularized by Harvard
political scientist Joseph Nye in his book, Bound to Lead, have been distorted over
time, and often tend to serve as a shibboleth for whatever point a particular author
wishes to make about mistakes in U.S. foreign policy. Nye's original definitions are as
follows: "hard power" is the ability of the United States to conduct foreign policy and
achieve its wishes on the world stage through means of force, force projection, threats,
and implied threats. "Soft power" is the ability of the United States to achieve these
same goals by powers of persuasion or envy or other emotions felt by those countries
that are the target of U.S. policy. JOSEPH NYE, JR., BOUND To LEAD 1-20, 220-36
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manufacturing capabilities and market success is of vital interest to
U.S. national security, just as Europe has recognized the importance
of Airbus in protecting the security of Europe. The corollary is also
true: those outside forces that threaten Boeing, especially by utilizing
extra-market methods of protection with which Boeing cannot legally
12
or practically compete,' pose a danger to U.S. national security.
Past subsidies offered to Airbus Industrie by various EU Member
States, and especially the subsidies currently being contemplated to
assist in the development of the A380 super-jumbo jet, are an
example of such dangerous forces. These European actions require
that the United States attempt to halt the subsidies through the
various international dispute resolution systems available. If the
available mechanisms seem unable to handle a dispute of this
potential magnitude, extra-judicial measures, such as diplomacy,
must be used.
Airbus' actions seem likely to necessitate a complete
reformulation of U.S. national security with respect to its industrial
base and relations with the European Union. This is especially true
in light of other developments, such as the creation of the European
Army and increasingly divergent foreign policy goals of the European
Union and United States in the post-Cold War world. Some political
figures and economists argue that the economies of the United States
and Europe are so intertwined that substantial policy shifts might
have potentially destabilizing second-order effects.' 3 Nevertheless,
the recent policy of Airbus and the European Union has been to rely
more on European suppliers and sub-contractors and to use Airbus to
build the European aircraft industry, and to further aid the
integration of Europe. 14 This seems likely to continue as Europe
asserts its emerging power and independence. 15

(1955). Economic power is much more than a certain contribution to a nation's GDP;
economic power can serve to facilitate the growth of hard and particularly soft power as

well.
11.

The type of direct subsidies and guarantees that Airbus receives are

extremely rare in U.S. economic policy, seen in the New Deal, World War II, the
Chrysler bailout, and the area of project finance, but rarely elsewhere. Other types of

U.S. assistance to Boeing, mainly in the form of military contracts, are discussed infra
note 61 and accompanying text.
12.
John Tierney, Pursuit of Purpose in Foreign Policy, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2000, at A16.

13.

A leading EU official has argued that the economies of the United States

and Europe are so intertwined that to separate them would be to destroy them. Leon
Brittan, Europe and America: Staying Together (Nov. 21, 1997), at http://www.eurunion.org/
news/speeches/1997/9711201b.htm.
14.
Airbus Industrie Paints Upbeat Picture for European Suppliers, M2
PRESSWIRE, June 3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 19095846.
15.
William Lipinski, Renew The Spirit Of The Clippers, at
http://www.house.gov/lipinski/aviation.htm (outlining a protectionist stance against

Airbus that does not touch on the nuances of international relations).
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When combined with the growing popularity of the proposed
European Army, 1 6 the potential gains in European technological
capabilities, especially in the aerospace sector, pose a potential threat
to U.S. national security on several levels. An increase in European
technological power could lead to a Europe whose security goals differ
from those of the United States, with the ability to implement its
goals through its new technological and military power. Points of
dispute would not merely be specific instances such as intervention in
the Balkans, but rather conflicting worldviews between the two blocs,
with major flash points coming in such places as formerly Sovietcontrolled space and the Middle East. 17 In the post-World War II
world, nearly all conflicts between European and U.S. foreign policy
ideas have been resolved in favor of the United States.1s Europe
would have less incentive to subordinate its goals to those of the
United States in a world in which European and U.S. power was close
to parity and in which Europe had achieved a significant degree of
technological and military independence.
In economic terms, the United States and Europe are close to
parity already. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the European
Union was approximately $7.8 trillion in 2000, as compared to $10
trillion in the United States.' 9 The population of the European Union
has already outpaced that of the United States.2 0 The proposed
accession to the European Union of emerging Central and Eastern
European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, will
21
further close the gap.

16.
Greta Hopkins, Leaders Endorse EuropeanPeacekeeping Initiative, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28920078. There is considerable
uncertainty about how such a force would work within the NATO structure.
Uncertainty Regarding European Union Force in NATO, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 12,
2000, at A5.
17.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and their chaotic aftermath,
would seem to render disputes between Europe and the United States less pressing, as
both ally to combat terrorism. However, if the fight against terror is successful, world
geo-politics will return to a pre-September 11 state fairly quickly, as both blocs strive
to influence events and places of significant economic and political impact.
18.
Examples of such conflicts that have been resolved in favor of the United
States are the Suez crisis, when the United Kingdom and France acceded to U.S.
wishes, and the debate over the introduction of Pershing intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in Europe.
19.
More Facts and Figures on the European Union and the United States,
available at http://www.eurunion.org/profile/euusstats.htm.
20.
Fact Sheet on the European Union, US NEwSWIRE, May 31, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 21166870.
21.
Id. (showing that the economies of the United States and Europe are of
similar size and, with the potential additions of more central and eastern Europe
countries to the European Union, Europe's economy could out-pace that of the United
States). The admittance of Poland to the European Union and the Euro would deprive
the United States of arguably its most reliable European ally. BBC Monitoring Int'l
Rep., Foreign Minister Says USA Remains Poland's Main Partner,Mar. 14, 2002.
Poland is perhaps the country which best remembers, from the perspective of the
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The possibility of confrontation between Europe and the United
States, two powerful blocs with different sources of strength and
geopolitical goals, is a classic precursor to global conflict on an
economic and systemic, if not a military, level. 22

The potential

danger inherent in such a conflict mandates that extreme care be
given to develop a solution, and existing trade remedy processes
heretofore used may be insufficient.
Part II of this Note focuses on the history of civil aircraft
subsidies under both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and EU-U.S. bilateral agreements, with particular emphasis
on the 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement. Part III considers the creation
of the A380 super-jumbo jet, and discusses U.S. grievances regarding
its development under the current GATT and bilateral agreement
structure. Part IV discusses both traditional and non-traditional
dispute settlement mechanisms in international trade disputes, and
traces the origin of these processes both in the GATT and its
successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). It addresses the
problems inherent in both approaches, as well as reforms that have
improved the effectiveness of these settlement mechanisms.
Finally, Part V argues that the dispute over the A380 may have
severe and long lasting ramifications. Current dispute resolution
mechanisms may be incapable, both by design and practice, of solving
the A380 dispute in light of its gravity. An extra-procedural process
is needed; the possible conflict is too serious to be handled through
normal trade-legal channels, and the problem should be addressed
through diplomatic means.
II. THE REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT SUBSIDIES
Several agreements govern aircraft subsidies currently used by
the European Union. This section examines the original GATT, and
then traces its development in the area of aircraft subsidies in the
Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds in order to provide the background for
examining the development of the A380.

United States, the lessons of the Cold War. Eric Black, The Pros and Cons of
Expansion, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 29, 1998, at 12A. Furthermore, it arguably
contains vast reserves of good feelings towards the United States, unmatched
anywhere else on the continent. Europe Faces Existential Crisis,UPI, Jan. 8, 2000.
22.
The two main types of relationships with states with which the United
States has normal relations are strategic partners and strategic competitors. Donald
Lambro, Warning On Policy Labeling, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15. Systemic
confrontation is where two competing systems seek to persuade neutral or unaligned

countries to join one side or the other.

Yoshi Tsurmi, Gross misrepresentation of

Japanese industrialpolicy must be stopped, JAPAN ECON. J., Apr. 12, 1983, at 24. The
Cold War (Soviet system v. Western system) is an example of a -systemic conflict that
did not become a military conflict.
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A. The Original GATT
The original GATT was created in 1947,23 in an attempt to

establish a workable framework for international trade and to avoid
the spiraling tariffs widely thought to have contributed to the Great
Depression. 24 The 1947 GATT did not include any limits on
subsidies; 25 it merely mandated that subsidies be reported, and
acknowledged their role in contributing to inefficiencies in
international trade. 26 Subsequent rounds of the GATT, while
addressing general subsidies in various forms, failed to specifically
address civil aircraft subsidies. 27 By the start of the Tokyo Round of
the GATT in the mid-1970s, however, Airbus Industrie had been
created and the issue of civil aircraft subsidies had become
contentious.
B. The Creation Of Airbus
The success of Airbus, with its business model of heavy
government subsidization without recoupment of costs, posed a
particular threat to U.S. airplane manufacturers. Moreover, it
created a general threat28 to a U.S. economy then in the midst of
stagflation and recession.
Airbus, founded in 1969 by state-run aerospace companies in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, was heavily funded by
those governments. 29 Among its advantages was a harmonious
aviation industry established by the United Kingdom and France
while creating Concorde. 30 Though its initial market share was
small, 31 Airbus quickly grew with the help of heavy development
subsidization. In addition, with center-left governments in power in

23.
Jennifer Hunter, Rattled in Seattle, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 13, 1999, at 22,
availableat 1999 WL 100238071.
Lewis J. Walker, The Bubble Machine, ON WALL ST., Mar. 1, 2000,
24.
available at 2000 WL 8694871.
25.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, art. XV [hereinafter GATT].
26.
Id. art. XVI. For a comprehensive single volume history of the GATT
development, see RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW (1998). For a
more concise volume, see BRIAN MCDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1998).

27.

Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's Uruguay

Round, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1194 (1995).
28.
Christopher Westley, The Smartest Fuel Price Policy?, J. COM., Mar. 1,
2000, at 6.
29.
See generally IAN MCINTYRE, DOGFIGHT: THE TRANSATLANTIc BATTLE OVER
AIRBUS (1992).
MATTHEW LYNN, BIRDS OF PREY 120-34 (1998).
30.
31.
Thomas C. Hayes, The Make or Break Sale for Boeing, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1982, § 3, at 1; Laurence Zuckerman, Boeing Plays an Aerial Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1982, § 3, at 1.
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European countries throughout the 1970s, possible nationalistic
implications for Airbus' success could be seen.3 2 While Boeing was a
privately established and financed company, albeit one with
33
significant involvement with United States defense contracts,
Europe's aerospace corporations were government creations, and from
the beginning of the jet age were entirely government financed and
supported.3 4 When Airbus was created in the late 1960s, the
Concorde was still under production by European governments
despite staggering costs. Boeing, meanwhile, was nearly bankrupted
by its development of the original jumbo, the 747.35 Boeing was
forced to lay off thousands of workers and to provide private sector
airlines with favorable purchase terms in order both to secure much
needed deposits and to establish the order base to spur further
Though eventually the U.S.
development and production. 36
government did provide minimal assistance, mostly in the form of
encouraging negotiations between Boeing and major airline
customers, it provided essentially nothing in the way of direct
financial support for the 747. This is in contrast to Europe's civil
aircraft development, which was almost entirely government
37
funded.
C. The GATT Tokyo Round
Civil aviation was the only industry given a separate agreement
at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of the GATT in 1979.38 The
agreement was a subject of much controversy, and served as more of
a general declaration of principles and a jumping-off point for future

32.
Survey, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1980, at 5. This time period is generally
considered the nadir of the nationalization of the Western European industrial
economy. Id.
33.

See generally EUGENE RODGERS, FLYING HIGH: THE STORY OF BOEING AND

THE RISE OF THE JETLINER INDUSTRY (1996); see also infra note 62 and accompanying
text.
LYNN, supra note 30, at 26-32. The world's first jet aircraft, the De
34.
Haviland Comet, was developed and financed by the British government and supported
by orders from the British state airline. Id. at 29. Similarly, the Concorde, perhaps
the first post-World War II effort by Europe to challenge U.S. technological superiority,
was entirely created by the British and French governments and kept alive by French
civil servants when it was clear that market realities doomed it to be a loss leader at
best, and quite likely an expensive failure. Id. at 59-77.
35.
Matthew Brelis, Airbus Stakes its Futureon a 555 Seat Jumbo Jet, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2000, at C2.
36.
Id. at 78-99.
37.
Id. at 92-94.
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th
38.
Supp.) at 162, Annex 4A (1979) [hereinafter Civil Aircraft Agreement]. Signatories
included Canada, Egypt, the European Union, Japan, Macau, Norway, Romania,
Switzerland, and the United States. Id.
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negotiations than as a specific action document. 39 However, the
agreement did boast several concrete accomplishments.
40
Under this Round, export subsidies were essentially forbidden
both under the general GATT subsidies code 4" and the specific Civil
Aircraft Agreement, which specified that this portion of the general
code was applicable to the civil aircraft industry. 42 In the main GATT
agreement, domestic subsidies were permitted, and it was noted that
such subsidies were "widely used as important instruments for the
promotion of social and economic policy objectives, [and the
agreement does not] intend to restrict the right of signatories to use
43
such subsidies.'
Domestic subsidies, the subsidies most commonly at issue in
international trade law today, is where the battle over civil aircraft
financing and subsidization has been fought and in which the most
contentious negotiations have taken place. 44 However, both the
competitive disadvantage of the U.S. position in negotiations and the
pressures on U.S. trade negotiators to arrange a face-saving deal left
domestic subsidies unaddressed in the Tokyo Round Civil Aircraft
Some practices, such as government-supported
Agreement. 45
marketing, were limited by the Agreement, 46 and signatories were
encouraged to price their airplanes in a manner designed to recoup
normal development costs and end the practice of development
subsidization followed by below-cost pricing. The subsidy practices
that had given Airbus an advantage, however, were not addressed

39.
MCDONALD, supra note 26, at 148.
40.
Export subsidies, which are paid to domestic industries to subsidize only
those particular products that are exported, while leaving products intended for
domestic consumption to sell at a market price, are a potentially valuable subsidy in
the civil aircraft field. JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 75758 (1995). However, the removal of export subsidies from the available tools with
which European nations could assist Airbus still left intact the possibility of domestic
subsidies, which are subsidies paid to a company to develop and sell products
regardless of their intended market. Id. at 758.
41.
Agreement in Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) art. 9 (1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code] (noting an exception for farm
products).
42.
Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 4-6.
43.
Subsidies Code, supra note 41, art. 11(1).
44.
KEITH HAYWARD, INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN CIVIL AEROSPACE 176
(1986).
The main reason for the U.S. disadvantage in the
45.
Id. at 170-97.
negotiations was the simple fact that they were trying to change the status quo, which
permitted subsidies of the kind that were permitting Airbus to flourish; any deal the
United States could come away with was by definition better than the current
situation. Id.
46.
An example of government-supported marketing is the situation of
pressuring allies to buy the national plane in exchange for strategic support. Air
Pacific says it gave Airbus fair chance, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 1, 1997, available
at 1997 WL 2033237.
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substantively. 47 Instead, the issue of domestic subsidies was left to
fester throughout the 1980s, and was only addressed in an agreement
signed more than ten years later in the midst of even more political
48
pressure than the Tokyo Round accord.

D. The 1992 BilateralAgreement And The Uruguay Round
The political pressures on the U.S. government to limit subsidies
increased from the late 1970s to the 1990s. 49 Airbus' penetration of
the United States and key foreign markets, as well as the deficit in
the U.S. balance of payments, were both at their peak; both were
significantly higher than they had been even in the Carter years. 50
Mindful of these economic and political factors, in 1992 the Bush

Administration entered into negotiations seeking to limit production
and development subsidies. 5 1 These negotiations initially yielded
limited results.

On April 1, 1992 the United States and Europe agreed on
substantive subsidy limits,5 2 only to see the agreement come under
criticism

from

leaders

in

the

United

States

insufficiently tough on Airbus' practices.

53

who

viewed

it

as

The negotiators, who

thought that they had concluded an agreement, then reopened the

47.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 70-80 (1986).
Richard W. Stevenson & David E. Sanger, U.S. Braces for Wider Trade
48.
Gaps and New Confrontations,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at D1.
49.
Michael J. Levick, The Productionof Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of Two
World Giants, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 433, 460-61 (1993).
50.
Id.
51.
President's 1992 Trade Policy Agenda, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at
422 (Mar. 4, 1992). There were significant pressures on President Bush from many
different sides in the subsidy negotiations. As a sitting President in the middle of what
would ultimately be an unsuccessful re-election campaign, it would have been
politically unwise to enter into negotiations with the Europeans only to see the
European Union adopt a hard line, and the talks fail. Martin Fletcher, Rough
Diamond Clinton Cuts Tough Deals on Trade, TIMES (London), Feb. 15, 1994. On the
other hand, the insurgent primary campaign of Patrick Buchanan and the nascent
Ross Perot campaign showed that there was a fertile vein of protectionism still alive in
the United States, and there was considerable anger regarding European subsidies.
Peter Wilson, Perot Enlists Protectionists, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 12, 1996, at 6. In
addition, John Danforth, the powerful Republican Senator from Missouri, the home to
McDonnell Douglas (which would eventually be forced to merge with Boeing after being
demolished by Airbus), was applying great pressure on the White House to enter into
negotiations. Charlotte Gimes, Congress Warns Against Airbus Subsidies, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 1992, at lB. Danforth stated that the United States should
take enforcement action if the negotiations were not successful, and then decried the
eventual agreement as too weak. Id.; see also Stuart Auerbach, Opposition Emerges to
Airbus Subsidies Accord, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1992, at A16.
52.
Roger Cohen, United States and Europe Agree on Limits To Subsidies for
Aircraft Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at Al.
See Auerbach, supranote 51.
53.
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talks over several key points. 54
The amount of an aircraft's
development costs allowed to be financed by government was the key
issue precluding a final agreement. 55 A deal was finally reached, and
the resulting 1992 EU-U.S. Civil Aviation Agreement included
several structural changes to world trade law that limited or capped
the use of subsidies. 56 The Agreement covered aircraft of one
hundred seats or more, 5 7 and its core limitation was that government
funding for new aircraft development could not exceed thirty-three
percent of a new plane's total development costs. Furthermore, the
manufacturer must be able to repay the full amount of the subsidy
within seventeen years. 58 The Agreement standardized the interest
rate at which Airbus had to repay government or governmentsponsored loans, 59 and banned all production subsidies. 60
The
Agreement also limited "identifiable benefits from indirect support" of
government funding to three percent of industry-wide turnover, and
four percent of any one company's turnover. 6 1 The Europeans, who
felt that Boeing and U.S. industry received major indirect benefits
62
from the U.S. military, insisted on this clause.

54.
Keith Bradsher, Trade Talks Reopened Secretly Over Key Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1992, at D2.
55.
Id.
56.
Specifically, the capped subsidies included those given by state entities to
private manufacturers to develop civil aircraft. See Agreement Concerning the
Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large
Aircraft, art. 35, 1992 O.J. (L 301) 32.
57.
This left out the small jet market. LAURA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM
206 (1993). The market for small jets is a potentially lucrative one and the only area of
civil aircraft development in which non-European or U.S. companies have been able to
challenge the Boeing-Airbus duopoly; Bombardier of Canada and Embraer of Brazil are
leaders in the small jet space. Super-Jumbo trade war ahead, ECONOMIST, May 6,
2000, at 20.
58.
TYSON, supra note 57, at 208-09.
59.
In early 1991 a GATT panel had found that Germany had violated the
treaty by providing exchange-rate guarantees to Airbus' German partner, a highly
embarrassing setback for Europe's efforts to portray Airbus' operations as well within
the boundaries of free trade capitalism as defined by international trade agreements.
Airbus Loses GATT Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at D7. The United States
vehemently disagreed with the guarantees; U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
called the German guarantees "the most reprehensible type of subsidy ... much worse
than the usual production subsidies. Once you subsidize currency fluctuations you're
destroying the balance wheel that makes the trade mechanism work." TYSON, supra
note 57, at 206.
60.
TYSON, supra note 57, at 208.
61.
Id.
62.
For example, if Boeing won a military contract to develop a new airplane
navigation system, it could put the benefits of its government-sponsored navigation
research to work when constructing a navigation system for a new civilian aircraft.
There have also been similar European allegations that U.S. manufacturers profit from
military funding in the field of engine design and production. U.S Rejects European
EU-Backed Proposalfor GATT Civil Aircraft Agreement, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), May
20, 1994 [hereinafter U.S. Rejects Proposal]. European aerospace leaders have also
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The Uruguay Round of the GATT, which began in 1986 and
concluded in 1994,63 hoped to address such contentious subjects as
commercial aircraft subsidies in its efforts to forge a broad
international trade consensus in the post-Cold War world. 64
A
comprehensive Uruguay Round agreement was not reached, however,
primarily due to the differences between the two main disputants, the
65
United States and the European Union.
By 1994, a final Uruguay Round agreement was in sight, but
66
fierce divisions remained over the issue of civil aircraft subsidies.
67
The French Airbus partner, Aerospatiale, called for an agreement.
Aerospatiale feared that to conclude the Uruguay Round without an
additional civil aircraft agreement would result in the application of
the GATT subsidies code to all aspects of commercial aviation not
specifically covered by the 1992 bilateral agreement. 68 Aerospatiale
also felt that this was "inapplicable and inadequate,"6 9 and could lead
70
to a trade war.
As negotiations continued, however, it became apparent that no
agreement could be reached that would satisfy important political
71
constituencies in both the European Union and the United States.
The United States rejected several European proposals for a weak
subsidies code, 72 and the final GATT treaty was signed and ratified
without explicitly dealing with civil aircraft production. 73 As a result,
the 1992 Bilateral Agreement remained in force, as supplemented by
the 1979 Tokyo Round agreement. 74 Where the Uruguay Round

made explicit appeals for Airbus to follow what it claims is the U.S. model of indirect
subsidies by having.the four member countries of Airbus divide the Airbus' Research
and Development costs. Europe Should Follow U.S. Example in FinancingAircraft
Development, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Jan. 31, 1994.
63.
For a good history of general GATT and WTO proceedings, see BHALA &
KENNEDY, supra note 26.
64.
Id. at 1311.
65.
Canada and Brazil are the third and fourth biggest aircraft producers, a
distant third and fourth. Kevin Done, Survey, Aerospace 2000, FIN. TIMES, July 24,
2000, at 9. See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66.
U.S., European Trade Negotiators Locked in All-night Talks, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1993, available at 1993 WL 11131200.
67.
European Companies Seek Advantage When Aviation Subsidy Talks
Resume, AVIATION EUR., Dec. 16, 1993.

68.
Airbus PartnersSeek Separate GATT Agreement for Aircraft, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Sept. 28, 1993.
69.
French Partner in Airbus Sees Future Dispute, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
Jan. 6,1994.
70.

71.
Int'l Trade
72.
73.
74.

Id.

U.S. Agrees to GATT Panel on Steel to Probe EU Charges of Unfair Duties,
Daily (BNA), Apr. 29, 1994; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See U.S. Rejects Proposal,supra note 62.
Clinton Signs GATT Legislation, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Dec. 9, 1994.
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 1311.
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GATT subsidy code and the previous bilateral agreements came into
75
conflict, the earlier, industry-specific agreements would control.
Since the failed conclusion of the Uruguay Round, conflict
between the European Union and United States in the civil aircraft
field has been confined to two central areas: debate over European
approval of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger 7 6 and the
subsidization by European governments of Airbus' proposed superjumbo jet. The development of the super-jumbo jet is where the
conflict between the European and U.S. aviation industries has been
most fierce. It is also the area with the most potential for impact on
77
future EU-U.S. relations.

III. THE A380
This section considers the need for a super-jumbo aircraft and
traces the actions of Airbus to develop such an aircraft. This is done
in order to provide a framework for considering possible U.S.
grievances.
A. The Need For A Super-Jumbo
The Boeing 747, the world's only jumbo jet, has been the premier
jet for long-haul international travel since its introduction in the late
1960s. 78 Updated models of the 747 are still in production, and it
remains a backbone of Boeing's line. 79 While Airbus has introduced
several jets designed to compete with smaller Boeing products, it has
not attempted to directly compete with the 747-the world's largest,
80
most expensive, and most profitable commercial aircraft.
At the Paris Air Show in 1991, riding high after driving Boeing's
market share below fifty percent, Airbus announced that it would
begin preliminary development of a passenger plane with a capacity

75.
World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
W/T/IL193 (1996), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp.
76.
See generally Sondra Roberto, Note, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
Merger Review: A Serious Stretch of European Competition Powers, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 593 (1998). The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is outside the scope of this Note.
77.
European Union Threatens to Pull Out of Pact on Aircraft Subsidy
Limitations, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), June 11, 1997 (summing up the intersection
between the two issues).
78.
Stuart F. Brown, How to Build a Really, Really, Really Big Plane,
FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 144.
79.
RODGERS, supra note 33, at 296. This is a useful book dealing with the
development of Boeing as a cornerstone of the U.S. economy.
80.
Francis Kan, Fight the Friendly Skies, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 21,
2000, available at 2000 WL 4653594. The Airbus A340-600 carries only slightly fewer
passengers than an early-model 747, but Airbus has not attempted to sell the A340-600
as a 747 replacement. Id.
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of up to 700-the largest in history. 8 ' Despite this announcement,
after the signing of the 1992 Bilateral Agreement, Airbus announced
that it would abandon its solo effort and entered into discussions with
Boeing for joint development of the super-jumbo.8 2 With potential
development costs estimated at up to $15 billion, a joint project was
believed to be the only way Airbus could develop a new plane and
stay within the boundaries of the subsidy agreement.8 3 Boeing and
Airbus agreed to a one-year feasibility study of the project, which took

place in

1993.84

Though the initial cooperation went beyond the feasibility
study,8 5 the companies eventually decided not to proceed with the
joint project. 86 Even during periods of putative cooperation, the two
companies pursued different tracks, perhaps in preparation for the
eventual need to proceed on their own.8 7 The cooperation ended in
1995, with each side claiming that the market would not bear the
introduction of such a large airplane. 88 Airbus then proceeded to
develop just such a plane independently.
B. FurtherDevelopment Of The A380 By Airbus
Airbus continued to proceed with its plans and development,
albeit in a low profile manner,8 9 despite the breakdown of cooperation
with Boeing and negative reports by aviation analysts. 90 From 1997
to 2000, the company continued to talk to potential partners and
customers about the need for a super-jumbo, 91 and became convinced
that its future depended on having its own top of the line superjumbo. 92 It appears that Airbus' decision to develop the super-jumbo

81.

Steven Greenhouse, There's No Stopping Europe's Airbus Now, N.Y. TIMES,

June 23, 1991, § 3, at 1.
82.
Roger Cohen, Confusion on Plans for a Giant Plane, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1993, at D4.
83.
Id.
84.
Boeing and Airbus Move Ahead With Plans for Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1993, at D4.
85.
Boeing Talks with Airbus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at D6.

86.

John Holusha, Jumbo-jet Plan is Scrapped by Boeing and Europeans, N.Y.

TIMES, July 11, 1995, at D2.

87.

Michael Mecham, Airbus to Seek Feedback on Super-jumbo Concept,

AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1994, at 49, available at 1994 WL 2603442.
88.
See Holusha, supranote 86.

89.

John Tagliabue, Airbus Wins 2 Big Orders for 4-Engine Rival to 747, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at 32. The A3XX was at this point merely a part of Airbus'
possible future product offering, and not a centerpiece. Id.
90.
Adam Bryant, The $1 Trillion Dogfight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1997, § 3, at
1.

91.
Matthew Wald, The Airline Industry May Get a Little Smaller So It Can
Get Bigger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at C19.
92.
Laurence Zuckerman, The Jet Wars of the Future. Airbus Prepares to Take
on 'the Boeing that Will Be', N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1999, at C1.

20021

SUPER JUMBO PROBLEM

was not strictly a business decision, but was also motivated, at least

in part, by strategic considerations. 93 Airbus announced tentative
plans to proceed with the A380 in mid-2000, contingent upon
receiving forty to fifty orders from airline customers. 94 The orders
were received, 95 and in December 2000 Airbus officially announced
the launch of the 500 to 900 seat A380, to be delivered sometime
around 2006.96

The reaction of Boeing and the U.S. government was swift and
predictable. Both parties claimed that, despite the conversion of
Airbus from a French holding company to a joint stock company in
mid-2000, 97 the program was unfairly and perhaps illegally
subsidized by European governments, and that Airbus' actions could
start a trade war. 98 Boeing claimed that it had not proceeded with its
plans for a super-jumbo because of the potentially prohibitive cost,
and that for Airbus to develop such a plane with the backing of
European governments would be a violation of world trade
conventions.9 9 Airbus responded that everything it was doing was
within the letter of the agreements signed by the European Union
and United States, and that it would proceed as planned. 100
IV. CONVENTIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

Under international law, there are several conventional
mechanisms through which a potential EU-U.S. dispute over
European funding of the A380 could be resolved, including GATT, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, and
NAFTA.10 1

The dispute settlement procedures of the original GATT
Agreement, which were in force from 1947 until the conclusion of the

93.
Id.
Wayne Arnold, Airbus Wins $8 Billion Deal For Its New Jet, N.Y. TIMES,
94.
Sept. 30, 2000, at C1.
95.
Suzanne Kapner, Debt Payment is Skipped in Britain,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2000, at C2.
96.
John Tagliabue, Airbus Clears Plans to Build Long-Range Jumbo Jet, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at W1.
97.
European Aircraft Maker Prices Its Shares, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at
C2. Airbus was converted from a French holding company to an 80% subsidiary of
EADS, a publicly traded French and German company, which underwent an I.P.O. in
2000. William Wright, Turkey of the Quarter, FIN. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2000, available at
2000 WL 9075985.
How Will the New Airbus Be PaidFor?, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at C4.
98.
Blair Pethal, Trade Group Has Jumbo Concerns, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11,
99.
2001, at E6.
100.
EU Challenges US FundingFor Boeing, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERVICE, Jan.
12, 2001; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
101.
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 26, §§ 2.3-2.5, at 171; § 1.6, at 115.
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Uruguay Round in 1994,102 were largely unstructured and depended
on general cooperation and a desire on the part of participating
nations to avoid a general trade conflagration. It did not contain
enforcement mechanisms adequate to coerce cooperation. 10 3 In 1994
the DSU of the WTO replaced GATT as the mechanism through
which participating organizations would regulate and develop global
trade policies.' 0 4
Under the DSU, the world trading system
developed a more substantial enforcement mechanism that provides
for the possibility of significant reprisals for non-compliance with
DSU decisions. 10 5 In addition, there are other commonly accepted
methods of both settling trade disputes and reaching new trade
1
understanding, such as the one used in NAFTA. 06
A review of both past and present enforcement mechanisms gives
a useful roadmap to guide settlement of the current dispute over the
A380. However, the formal framework of the world trading system
10 7
has never been confronted with a case of this potential magnitude.
The structures involved have not yet proven their ability to sustain
the massive pressures stemming from a case with the potential to
affect the standing political order for much of the developed world. In
such a case, in which EU-U.S. relations could be permanently
realigned, it seems unlikely that current structures would be
adequate.
There is substantial uncertainty over which dispute resolution
system would govern the 1992 Bilateral Agreement.'0 " If the parties
involved are unable to agree even on a forum to hear their
differences, it seems unlikely that the losing party would accept a
resolution reached by that forum. Thus, it seems likely that in order
to affect a more long-lasting and permanent solution to the A380
crisis and similar crises likely to arise in the era of globalization,
consideration must be given to settling the dispute in extra-judicial
proceedings such as political negotiations. With this cautionary note
in mind, it is useful to examine existing dispute resolution procedures
for their explicative value as a framework for future political
negotiations.

102.

DAVID PALMETER & PETROS MAVROIDIS,

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 7-13 (1999).
103.
Id. at 7-11.
104.
Id. at 16-18.
105.
Id.
106.
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 240.
107.
See ROBERT E. HUDEc, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).

TRADE LAW: THE

108.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 131-32; see also infra notes
177-82 and accompanying text.
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A. The GATT Dispute Resolution Procedures
The original GATT dispute resolution procedures had their roots
in the conditions surrounding the creation of the GATT, which in turn
was based on the Bretton Woods organizations founded in the waning
days of World War 11.109 Cognizant of the need to formalize the postwar economic order, 110 the leading industrial countries sought to
create a mechanism to avoid devastating trade spirals such as SmootHawley, which many believed to have precipitated World War II. 111
At the same time, the participants were leery of any mechanism that
would seriously compromise sovereignty and could enforce
cooperation. 112 The notions of trust and non-zero-sumness' 3 that
manifest themselves significantly in today's international economic
order were not present in the days immediately following World War
II. Nations were eager to protect both their economic interests and
their future ability to act on changes in the world order without being
hampered by restrictive international agreements." 4 : Against this
backdrop, the comparatively weak enforcement scheme of the original
GATT is understandable.
Furthermore, the original dispute resolution system created by
the 1947 GATT was merely intended as a stop-gap measure. 115 The
participating nations anticipated the imminent enactment of the
International Trade Organization (ITO), whose design included a
significantly strengthened dispute resolution procedure. 116 The U.S.

109.
Id. at 1-2.
110.
In a similar manner, the post-war political order was formalized through
such actions as the establishment of the United Nations. Id.
111.
Id.
112.

Id. at 3-4.

113.
Robert Wright, one of the leading modern thinkers in the field of
evolutionary psychology and a pioneer in applying game theory to modern geo-political
contexts, has offered this definition of non-zero-sum games and non-zero-sumness as
they apply to political actors:
If self-interested entities are to realize mutual profit in a non-zero-sum
situation, two problems typically must be solved: communication and trust....
A non-zero-sum relationship is . . . a relationship in which, if cooperation did
take place, it would benefit both parties ....
Non-zero-sumness is a kind of
potential.., it can be tapped or not tapped, depending on how people behave...
To realize non-zero-sumness-to turn the potential into positive sums-often
creates even more potential, more non-zero-sumness.
ROBERT WRIGHT, NON-ZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 337-39 (2000).
114.
The U.N. Charter has been seen by some analysts as being similarly

flexible. Symposium, The Prospective Role of the United Nations in Dealing with the
International Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Period: An Analysis in Light of the
PersianGulf Crisis,22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9, 63 (1992).
115.
HUDEC, supranote 107, at 4-8.
116.

Id. at 23-37.

882

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 35:865

Congress refused to ratify the ITO, 117 however, leaving it to wither on
the vine. 118 Thus, the primitive dispute resolution measures found in
the original GATT had to suffice for world trading disputes until
1994. Until then, the only formal changes were minor modifications
without significant effect. 119
The structures and procedures of dispute resolution under GATT
are largely diplomatic in tone. 120 Such a focus is understandable
considering that in the early days of the Bretton Woods world
system 121" there was a greater emphasis on mutual comity and
acceptance of this original "new world order" than for the creation of a
Such procedures would have
system of enforcement procedures.
served to trap nations into making concessions ordered by the new
international system before the system was able to achieve a patina
122
of legitimacy with either the nations or their citizens.
Early GATT procedures were not adequately developed to create
a complex code of legal agreements. 123 The initial phase of any GATT
question required "sympathetic consideration" of the complaint by the
offending party, 124 and consultation by all parties involved in the
dispute in an attempt to fashion a non-judicial remedy. 125 If the
attempt at a non-judicial remedy failed, the party bringing the
dispute could seek to involve other GATT parties, known as
"contracting parties."'126 During the 1950s, what came to be known as
"panel procedures" were developed. 127 These procedures involved a
neutral board comprised of delegates from "contracting parties" who
had no stake in the dispute at hand. These parties were responsible
for deciding the merits of the individual disputes and deciding how
treaty obligations applied to the facts of the case. 128 The panel would

Id. at 69.
118.
The abandonment of the ITO and its subsequent failure recalls similar
treatment by the U.S. Senate of the League of Nations, following World War I.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 2. Of course, rejection of the ITO did not
have the same grave consequences that the rejection of the League of Nations did.
119.
HUDEC, supra note 107, at 68-73.
Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers
120.
Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 393-95 (1995).
121.
For background on the Bretton Woods system as a whole, see John
Ciorciari, A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial
117.

Institutionsin InternationalPeace Operations,22 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 292 (1998).
122.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 1-3; see also supra notes 112-13

and accompanying text.
123.
For an excellent general critique of the early GATT procedures, see Jeffery
L. Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits: The GATT,the ICJ,and Trade-EnvironmentDisputes,
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1063-66 (1994).
124.
GATT, supra note 25, art. XII.
125.
Id.; see also id. art. XIII.
126.
Id. art. XII.
Young, supra note 120, at 398.
127.
128.
Martin Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade
Disputes, 61 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144, 148 (1967).
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then make recommendations for a solution to the entire GATT
group. 129 Recommended measures could range from suspension of
GATT rights to imposition of new duties upon the goods in question.
The GATT was not an organization per se but rather a group of
nations, all considered contracting parties. 13 0 By both GATT and
international law conventions, any report recommending punishment
had to be approved by a unanimous vote of all the contracting parties,
including the offending party against whom the action was being
contemplated. 131 In fact, any one party, involved or not, could block
the creation and utilization of the panel procedure. 132 Despite this
potential for stagnation, however, there was substantial diplomatic
pressure upon GATT Members to cooperate. 133 Even without a
binding legal enforcement mechanism, thirty of the forty complaints
filed between 1952 and 1958 were resolved in favor of the
complaining party, with the complained-of measures being
134
eliminated.
Though the original GATT dispute resolution procedure lacked
rigid structure, the Tokyo Round negotiations, concluded in 1979,
135
formalized the process in an attempt to streamline procedures.
The Understanding of 1979 sought to codify GATT procedures as they
had developed since 1947.136 The Understanding put strict timelines
on panel actions 137 and called for mandatory consideration of reports
that were adopted by a particular panel. 138 Though these reports
could still be rejected by even one party, 139 forcing the contracting
parties to consider the report served to force states to act openly and
visibly. By placing a premium on openness and transparency, the
Understanding served to encourage mutual cooperation. 140

129.
GATT, supra note 25, arts. XII, XIV.
130.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 8.
131.
Id. at 9-10. As Palmeter and Mavroidis note, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties mandates a need for unanimity unless otherwise provided. Id.
132.
Id.
133.
See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
134.
Robert E. Huden, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An
Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 151 n.10 (1980).
135.
For a good overview of the Tokyo Round proceedings, see Curtis Reitz,
Enforcement of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
555, 562-80 (1996).
136.
Id. at 565; see also Young, supra note 120; Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210, 215 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Understanding].
137.
1979 Understanding, supra note 136, at 11. This was done in an attempt to
prevent countries from stalling panel consideration by engaging in political tactics. See
U.S. Stalling GATT Panel "Gas Guzzler" Ruling, Sources Say, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
June 29, 1994.
138.
1979 Understanding, supra note 136, at 21.
139.
Id. at 14-21.
140.
For a general discussion of this, see Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalTrade
and the "Rule of Law", 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1016 (1985). As Young points outs, the annex
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Though it was a fairly substantial revision of GATT dispute
resolution procedures, the 1979 Understanding did not push
procedures away from its negotiated, diplomatic base. 14 1 Mediation
142
was still the dominant characteristic of GATT dispute resolution
and the Understanding did little if anything to give enforcement any
teeth. 143 The codified mechanisms did serve as a spur for dispute
settlement, however. Though settlement rates had stagnated by the
1970s, the 1980s saw GATT settlement develop into quite a powerful
144
legal instrument.
The GATT dispute resolution system, even as formalized by the
1979 Understanding, was hampered from the start due to its lack of
enforcement mechanisms and its potential for obstruction from one
contracting party. One reasons for its limited success was the
political will of the participating governments. This political will was
present for several reasons. First, the original GATT was comprised
of relatively few, homogeneous nations, each of whom was trying to
rebuild its economy from either the ravages of World War II, in the
case of the first European members, or from an economy which had
been placed on war footing more suitable to producing tanks than
cars, in the case of the U.S. economy. 145 In fact, with the exception of
a few small Eastern European states and post-colonial nations, all
the participants in the original GATT were in some way under the
Western umbrella. 146 The knowledge that there were additional
significant ties binding them tended to make the contracting parties
more aware of the need for harmony and the possible dangers
inherent in any serious sectional split.
Secondly, the presence of political will can be explained to some
Theoretically, the nations involved all
extent by game theory.
realized that they were engaged in a non-zero-sum game, in which
positive behavior would be rewarded in the future, and harmful
behavior would be punished. 147 Such a non-zero-sum game creates a
powerful incentive for countries to go along with the system, at least
to the same extent as their fellow members. Thus, diplomacy,
negotiations, and transparency can be powerful weapons leading to

to the Understanding calls for "mutually acceptable" solutions. Young, supra note 120,
at 404 n.30.
Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement Under the GATT
141.
and Tokyo Round Agreements, in UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
3-7 (1985).
See generally Young, supra note 120.
142.
After all, if the 1979 Understanding merely codified what already existed,
143.
no new enforcement mechanisms could have been added.
144.
HUDEC, supra note 107, at 14.
145.
Id. at 3.
Id.
146.
See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
147.
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trade harmonization even in the absence of available punitive
measures.
This is not to say that the GATT system did not have serious
problems. 148 The knowledge that any dispute resolution could be
rejected by any contracting party, especially the complained-of party,
served to influence which actions were brought. 149 In addition,
certain cases tended to drag on for years as the objections of one
contracting party blocked adoption of a resolution. 150 The absence of
time limits for panel action also resulted in significant delay, with the
eventual actions often being moot by the time they were actually
decided. 151 Overall, disputes that were deemed "un-resolvable" by the
complaining party were never brought, for fear of wasting time and
resources. 152 Although an excellent example of non-zero-sumness
within an international system, the dispute resolution mechanism
also involved trade unfairness and created inefficiencies that enabled
structural deficiencies to pool within the GATT system. The GATT
system also lacked appropriate staff resources for investigating and
53
resolving disputes.'
These problems, combined with the advent of section 301 trade
actions brought by the United States, 154 convinced the world trade
community that a more concrete dispute resolution system was
needed. This feeling was further heightened by the end of the Cold
War, which heralded the eventual entry into the world trading
system of many new countries not previously aligned with the
Western bloc. 15 6 The end of bi-polar hegemony brought a new

148.

See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).

149.
Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The WTO's First Two and a Half
Years of Dispute Resolution, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 481, 484 (1998).
150.
Terence P. Stewart, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, in 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2669-70 (Terrence P. Stewart
ed., 1993).
151.
Id.
152.
Stewart, supra note 150, at 484-85.

153.
See id. The complaining party realized that the only result of bringing an
action would be provocation of other parties without any possible favorable solutions,
so such actions were not brought. Id.
154.
Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING

LEGISLATION 581 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996).

Section 301 "permits the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate foreign practices and sanction
countries whose trade practices are deemed unfair .... The USTR has discretion under
law to investigate foreign trade practices and impose sanctions under its own initiative
or on behalf of domestic industries that lodged a petition if the USTR determines: (1)
unfair foreign trade practices are harming the United States' commerce, and (2) action
by the United States is appropriate."
Laws Affecting Exporters, available at
http://www.itds.treas.gov/LawsAffectingExporters.html.
155. Beyond the WTO: Alternatives to Economic Globalization (Nov. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.ifg.orgfbeyondwto.html, is an interesting look at WTO
expansion from a protectionist perspective.
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impetus for trade dispute resolution measures that could be enforced
against parties not previously involved in the world system. In
addition, parties were cautious about bringing controversial disputes
in light of the prospective Uruguay Round of negotiations, since the
new agreement would no doubt revamp dispute settlement
procedures in ways that could be beneficial to one of the involved
parties. 156 This feeling was manifested in provisional agreements
mid-way through the Uruguay Round, 157 and codified through the
elimination of the GATT and the creation of the World Trade
Organization at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations
in 1994.
B. The World Trade OrganizationDispute Resolution Procedures

The Uruguay Round of GATT saw the end of the loose GATT
structure as a world trade paradigm and the rise of the World Trade
Organization as the vehicle through which the world trading scheme
would be governed.' 5 8 Along with this new vehicle came a new and
strengthened dispute settlement procedure, the DSU. 159 The DSU
sought to address what had become the focal flaw of GATT
procedures-at least in the eyes of academic and legal theoreticiansthe ability under GATT for one party to delay or even derail the
60
process.1
The DSU created a new set of structures with unilateral powers
to act regardless of the wishes of the complaining party. While the
new structure was clearly a more enforceable and predictable one, it
also raised the specter of decisions being forced on Members against
161
their will, and the corresponding loss of confidence in the WTO.

156.

Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19

MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1200 (1998).

157.

PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 10-11 (regarding the Montreal

Rules).
158.
The GATT was not a formal organization, but rather a group of contracting
parties who joined the web of both bilateral and multilateral treaties that made up the
GATT. The World Trade Organization was a formal organization that tracked and
facilitated all such treaties. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 26.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
159.
Disputes, Apr.

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing

the World Trade

Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 404, 405 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
160.
Stewart, supra note 150, at 484-86.
161.
For example, the assumption by the European Central Bank (ECB) of
interest rate-setting power at the same time that the ECB has failed to introduce
reforms meant to promote transparency has weakened citizen confidence in the
European Union as a whole. John Schmid, The Euro in Crisis, and Words Fail Its
Guardian;He May Talk Too Much, ECB President Admits, INTL HERALD TRIB., Oct.
30, 2000, at 1.
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Under the DSU, the panel procedure remained in place, but
panel infrastructure was strengthened in both resources and
capabilities.' 6 2
The panels were made anonymous 163 and
164
confidential.
Qualifications were laid down for individual panel
members, 165 each of whom were designated to serve in an individual,
supranational capacity, rather than as a representative of a
particular country. 166 The main improvement from the previous
dispute resolution procedures is that the panel report was considered
to be automatically adopted unless a consensus decision of the panel
167
decided otherwise.
In recognition of the streamlining of the panel procedure, a new
Appellate Body (AB) was created.' 6 8 The AB, composed of members
from several different governments, 16 9 reviews the panel's decision
within a specified time frame, 170 and recommends measures for
compliance if violations are found. 171 Failure to comply with an AB
ruling leads first to mandated negotiations, 172 and then to a
consensus decides
subsequent stage of the DSU-unless
otherwise 173-allowing the suspension of trade concessions previously
174
held by the Member found in offense.
Overall, the DSU procedures are highly legalistic and
formalistic. 175 They are designed to succeed in an atmosphere of
distrust. They introduce uncertainty into the process by removing
elements of party-to-party negotiations, which are controllable by the
parties, and introducing legal decisions, which are not. Third parties
can bring complaints, which means that even if the two participating
parties wish to resolve their differences via diplomatic or other
means, the parties could still be forced into participating in the DSU
176
process by other parties with wide and varied motivations.

162. DSU, supra note 159, art. 1.
163.
Id. art. 14.
164. Id. app. 3.
165. Id. art. 8.
166. Id.
167. Id. art. 2.4.
168. Reitz, supra note 135, at 582-85.
169. DSU, supra note 159, art. 17.3. The AB currently consists of 7 people: an
American, a New Zealander, a German, a Filipino, a Japanese, a Uruguayan, and an
Egyptian.
170. Lichtenbaum, supra note 156, at 1201-02.
171. DSU, supra note 159, art. 17.13.
172. Id. art. 4.
173.
Id. art. 22.6.
174. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 16-17.
175. See Reitz, supra note 135, at 580-82.
176. There are limited issues of personal jurisdiction; see Giorgio Saceroti,
Judicial Review in InternationalArbitration and Adjudication: The Case of the WTO
Appellate Review, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 247-74 (Ernst-Ulrich Detersmann ed.,

1997).
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Therefore, despite the good intentions of the dispute resolution
reforms put in place by the WTO, the actual effect is a system that
discourages cooperation in favor of a procedure with guarantees.
This, in turn, results in an international order that permits third
party complaints when the involved parties would rather develop a
joint, private solution; the overall resulting structure could be a world
trading system that might not be up to the task of resolving
fundamental complaints and issues inappropriate for a legal dispute
resolution process.
Both the 1979 and 1992 Agreements on Civil Aircraft 177 have
had an uneasy relationship with the enforcement provisions of the
GATT and WTO dispute resolution procedures. The 1979 agreement
included the 1979 Understanding as its basis for dispute
settlement. 7 8 Appendix 1 of the 1992 agreement states that it is
covered by the DSU; it is not listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU as an
agreement that uses its own dispute settlement terms in place of
those of the DSU.' 79 However, the Committee on Trade in Civil
Aircraft has not officially notified the DSU, as it must, as to the
manner in which the DSU multilateral based procedures will be
applied. 180
There is corresponding uncertainty over the legal
mechanisms and even legal status of dispute resolution under the
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. As the report of the Committee
said in 1997:181 "At the meeting of 16 June, the Chairman recalled
that significant legal uncertainty surrounded the relationship
between the Agreement and other World Trade Organization
agreements as a result of the continuing failure to adapt the
8 2
Agreement to the World Trade Organization structure."'
No doubt due at least partially to the political sensitivity of the
underlying Agreement and potential disputes, there have been no
real efforts to reform the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft with
respect to its dispute resolution, or to bring it more in line with WTO
standards. Thus, the uncertainties involving the issue of civil aircraft
dispute resolution hangs like the sword of Damocles over the
European Union and the United States, implicitly invoked every time
one side or the other threatens formal action, but unlikely to fall so
long as both sides recognize the benefits of non-zero-sumness.

177.
The 1992 agreement also established a permanent Committee on Civil
Aviation under the World Trade Organization.
178.
Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 38, art. 8.8; see also 1979
Understanding, supra note 136.
179.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 102, at 131-32.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
See Report of the Committee On Trade in Civil Aircraft, in 1996 REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN CIVIL AIRCRAFT (1997).

2002]

SUPER JUMBO PROBLEM

V. CONCLUSION

The introduction of the A380 could have potentially destabilizing
effects not just on the civil aircraft field but also on EU-U.S. relations
in general. It is therefore vital that any solution to a EU-U.S. conflict
over the A380 be created with this in mind.
From the U.S. perspective, there are three troubling effects of
the A380's development. The first is on Boeing's role as a mainstay of
83
both the U.S. economy and the U.S. military-industrial complex.'
Secondly, it will enable Airbus to serve a greater role in meeting
Europe's military needs. Most importantly, it will unite Europe both
militarily and technologically; when combined with an independent
European foreign policy, this could threaten U.S. hegemony.
Success of the A380 could seriously impair both Boeing's
economic position and U.S. military industrial capacity. The end of
the Cold War has seen a sharp consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry from as many as twenty-five prime contractors to five, with
Boeing and Lockheed Martin being the only two remaining
contractors with aircraft manufacturing capability.18 4 If Boeing were
to encounter serious difficulties, the United States would be left with
one contractor capable of manufacturing military airplanes. 185 Since
Boeing derives most of its profits from its larger jets, anything that
impacts the future sales of these larger planes is a serious threat to
the company. 186 If the A380 succeeds as Airbus hopes, it would not
only put a crimp in Boeing's profits, but would also serve to subsidize
Airbus' development of other products that would threaten Boeing.
Especially troubling would be Airbus development of a direct
187
competitor to the 777, Boeing's newest and most advanced plane.
In short, the potential success of the A380 could serve as a catalyst
for the competitive success of Airbus and its partners and
subcontractors, and severely hurt Boeing's ability both to develop new
civil aircraft and to serve as a U.S. defense contractor.
The other damaging effect of A380 success, while perhaps more
ephemeral, is also potentially more harmful and destabilizing. Since
the end of the Cold War, Europe has taken a foreign and security
policy line that differs increasingly from that of the United States,
often in connection with the strengthened and expanded European

183.
184.

See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
Kenneth Gilpin, A Wary Eye on the Future for Military Contractors,N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, § 3, at 8.

185.
See id.
186.
Stanley Holmes, Boeing Beats Airbus in Race for Jet Orders-ButEuropean
Rival is GainingStrength, Closing Up the Gap, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 1999, at Al.
187.
See id.
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Union. 8 8 From the Middle East, where European support of Iran
and Iraq has effectively undermined the U.S. policy of isolating those
two "states of concern," 189 to the Balkans, 190 to the difference in
outrage over the Russian invasion of Chechnya, 191 the 1990s have
seen the Atlantic Alliance badly fray over defining strategic interests.
This divergence of interests has manifested itself in the recent
debate over the proposed European Army. 192 Strongly supported by
French and slightly less so by Germany, 193 this force would have a
structure outside that of NATO and would act when NATO was
unwilling to do so. 94 Though several smaller countries such as
Iceland and Norway are members of NATO but not the European
Union, 195 this proposed force would effectively be a way for Europe to
act independently of the United States, and to counter U.S. interests
Although recent
in a manner it could not do through NATO.
discussions between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush seem
to have developed a consensus that the proposed force would not be a
threat to NATO, 196 it should be noted that others, such as France's
President Chirac, might well have a different view, and were not a
party to those discussions. 197 Regardless, once such a force is created
and deployed there is little the United States could do in protest that
would not have much graver consequences.
With this backdrop in mind, it seems possible that funding by
EU governments and success of the A380 could contribute to a
destabilization of the situation. Europe has no military contractors
with the across-the-board strengths of Boeing or Lockheed Martin;
none are likely to be created by European nations in this age of
privatization over nationalization. Thus, Europe has relied on U.S.

188.

Jeffrey Gedmin, The New Europe-Menace; United by Anti-Americanism,

WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 29, 1999, at 19.
Robert Manning, Noble intent too far?,WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2000, at B1.
189.
190.
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192.
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TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at A8.
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TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at A20.
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contractors and technology since the end of World War II, and this
reliance has helped to keep Europe close to the U.S. worldview on a
host of issues. Without independent technological and military
capability, it is unlikely that the European Army, even if it were
launched, would be more than a shell used to assist NATO in various
ways. If the A380 succeeds, however; it could provide Europe with
the military industrial capability to be self-sufficient, or at least selfsufficient enough to enable Europe to challenge American hegemony
safely. A Europe united in policy, 198 currency, and economy, and
backed by independent armed forces, while nominally an ally of the
United States, in fact begins to look like something entirely
inconsistent with a Fukuyama-esque worldview. 199
The potential conflict between Europe and the United States
over the A380 could easily reach critical levels, and become the most
clear-cut confrontation between the two sides since the Suez Canal
crisis, if not the entire post-World War II period. Success of the A380
would greatly hinder both the economic and strategic positions of the
United States. On the economic front, a rejuvenated Airbus that
could compete with Boeing across all product lines would threaten the
largest U.S. exporter, as well as the vast web of subcontractors that it
supports. In addition, significant Airbus success would likely be
paralleled by other European advances in industrial technology and
exports. Combined with a more integrated European Union, this
would deal a substantial blow to many U.S. companies and further
increase the U.S. trade and balance of payments deficit. On a
strategic level, Airbus' success could lead to greater European
military integration.
With this in mind, it is obvious that traditional dispute
settlement mechanisms, whether based in GATT, the WTO, or other
agreements, are useless for solving the problem. There is substantial
uncertainty over which mechanism applies to the 1992 Bilateral
Agreement. Additionally, it is unlikely that either side would permit
such a potentially paradigm-shifting case to go before the WTO, a
body that currently lacks sufficient legitimacy. Finally, it is certainly
possible, especially in light of the vagueness with which it was
drafted and applied, that the 1992 Bilateral Agreement would not
actually cover the A380 situation. A different approach is needed.
In light of both the seriousness of the situation and the absence
of any clear remedy or vehicle for solution, the United States should
withdraw from the 1992 Bilateral Agreement and inform the
European Union of its desire to renegotiate terms of the WTO as it

198. A common foreign and security policy is one of three pillars of the European
Union. Common Foreign and Security Policy: Seeking a Broader Vision for the EU in
the World, EURO. REP., Mar. 3, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 26059472.
199.
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applies to civil aircraft. The United States should make the
European Union aware of the perceived strategic threat, so that
Europe is aware of the potential price in terms of de-linking its
capabilities and success with that of the United States, if it decided to
go down the path of strategic and military independence. Finally, if
the actions and deeds of the European Union suggest such a
reclassification is warranted, the United States should be prepared to
approach Europe as a strategic competitor rather than a strategic
partner. These may seem to be harsh notions at the present time; but
20 0
then again, in 1939 France's biggest trading partner was Germany.
Daniel L Fisher*

200.
Christopher Holton, Wall Street's Panda-Huggers(Oct. 10, 2000), available
at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/Archive-2000/guest-holton-10-10.html.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Vanderbilt University Law School. I wish to thank
the staff of the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, particularly Will
Sugden, for invaluable assistance with this Note. I would also like to thank my
parents, sister, and grandparents for all the love and support they have shown me. I
would particularly like to thank my grandfather, Maurice C. Greenbaum, a gentleman
of the old school, for showing me through his daily conduct what it means to be a
lawyer. Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst may be gone, but it is not forgotten.

